Nombre de la Asignatura: *Normativity, Meaning and Nature: Discussions on the Possibility of Naturalizing Intentionality*

 Créditos asociados:

Planificación: Segundo Semestre

 Carácter de la Asignatura: Mínimo.

 Requisitos: Seminario Mínimo.

 Profesor: Dr. Glenda Satne.

**General Description**

Assume some states of mind are contentful. Assume it is possible, for example, to think

thoughts that refer to things beyond themselves, thoughts that can be true or false.

Where, when and how did (and do) such contentful states of mind come on the scene?

How is content possible in a natural world? Anyone seeking to address these questions is in the game of trying to account for the existence of content in the natural world. The basic rules are well known and simple. Any proposed explanations must (i) not presuppose content and (ii) have recognized scientific credentials.

Haugeland 1990 classic ‘Intentionality All Stars’, likens the game of naturalizing content to a baseball game and identifies three main strategies that the All Star team in field employs against the Sceptics, who are perpetually up at bat. The team’s bases are occupied by different types of players: neo-Cartesians are on first; neo-behaviourists are on second base; and neo-pragmatists are on third. Apart from providing this helpful schema for locating three distinct approaches for addressing the question of how to naturalize content, Haugeland also offered a handy criterion for distinguishing between those occupying the outfield and infield. For him those closest to the action are those with the more developed and well worked out naturalistic theories of content.

Following Haugeland’s lead, the aim of this seminar is firmly focused on what’s happening in the infield. Particular aims of the seminar are: (1) to assess how things stand today, three decades after Haugeland’s seminal paper, with respect to the problem of how to naturalize intentionality, casting a fresh eye over the current state of play on each of the bases; and (2) to diagnose the root causes of the fundamental problems that have prevented the All Stars from winning the game to date, and discuss possible alternative strategies to address it that have been developed more recently in the field.

**Aims**

Upon completion of the course, the students should be able to

* understand current debates about the possibility of naturalizing intentionality, the main challenges to address and different strategies to meet them.
* become familiar with different approaches to intentionality.
* understand the difference/relations between biological, social and contentful norms and their roles in a characterization of intentionality.
* become familiar with some debates in evolutionary theory and their relevance for the question concerning the origins and nature of intentionality.
* engage in philosophical discussion, look for the relevant literature and construct properly philosophical arguments.
* write a philosophical paper contributing to the debate on the propospect of a naturalistic account of intentionality.

**Contents**

1. **Naturalizing Intentionality (Monday 6, Wednesday 8)**

**Mandatory Readings.**

1. Haugeland, J. “Intentionality all Stars”, *Philosophical Perspectives*, 4, 383–42.
2. Haugeland, J. “Truth and Rule-Following” In *Having thought: Essays in the metaphysics of mind* (pp. 305–361). Cambridge: Harvard UP.

**Further Readings.**

1. Rouse, J. *Articulating the world*, Chicago UP: Chicago, 2015 chapter II.
2. **The Neo-cartesian approach (Monday 13, Wednesday 22)**

**Mandatory Readings.**

1. Millikan, Ruth Garrett. “Biosemantics.” *Journal of Philosophy* 86, no. 6 (1989): 281–97.
2. Godfrey-Smith, Peter. “Signals, Icons, and Beliefs.” (and reply) In *Millikan and Her Critics*, 41–62.

**Further Readings.**

1. Fodor, J. (1990). *A theory of content and other essays*. Cambridge:MIT Press
2. Ryder, Dan, Justine Kingsbury, and Kenneth Williford. “Introduction.” In Millikan and Her Critics, 1–20.
3. Godfrey-Smith, P. (2006). Mental representation, naturalism and teleosemantics. In G. Macdonald & D. Papineau (Eds.), Teleosemantics (pp. 42–68). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
4. **The Neo-behaviorist Approach (Monday 27, Wednesday 29)**

**Mandatory Readings.**

1. Dennett, D.C. (2009). Intentional systems theory. In B.McLaughlin, A. Beckermann, & S.Walter (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind (pp. 339–50). Oxford University Press: Oxford.
2. Davidson, D. “The emergence of Thought” in Davidson, D. (2001), *Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective*, Oxford, Oxford UP

**Further Readings.**

1. Cash, M. (2008). The normativity problem: Evolution and naturalized semantics. Journal of Mind and Behavior, 29(1–2), 99–138.
2. Hutto, D., Satne, G. “The Natural Origins of Content”, *Philosophia*, 43: 3, September 2015.
3. Davidson, D. (1984). *Inquiries into truth and interpretation*. Oxford: Clarendon.

1. **The Neo-pragmatist approach (Monday 3, Wednesday 5)**

**Mandatory Readings.**

1. Brandom, R. *Making it Explicit*, Chapter III.
2. Satne, G. “Brandom and the Second Person”, *International Journal of Philosophical Studies*, March 2017, Vol. 25: 2, 189-209.

**Further Readings.**

1. Brandom, R. *Making it Explicit*, Camb. Mass: Harvard UP, 1994, Chapter I.
2. Varga, S. Intentionality, normativity and Naturalism, Philosophia, 43 (3):611-624 (2015)
3. Satne, G. “Brandom and McDowell: Hermeneutics and Normativity”, in Malpas, J. & Gander, H.-H., *The Routledge Handbook to Hermeneutics*, London: Routledge, 2014. 236-247.
4. **The Natural Origins of Content approach (Monday 1, Wednesday 3)**

**Mandatory Readings.**

1. Hutto, D., Satne, G. “The Natural Origins of Content”, *Philosophia*, , 43: 3, September 2015.
2. Satne, G. “Between Inferentialism and Intentionalism: the Role of Shared Activities in the Emergence of Human-Specific Cognitive Capacities” in Koreň, L., Schmid, H.B, Stovall, P., Townsend, L. *Inferentialism and Collective Intentionality,* Springer: Philosophy of Sociality series, forthcoming 2018.

**Further Readings.**

1. Hutto, D., Satne, G. “Wittgenstein in the Goldilock’s Zone”. Cahill, K. and Raleigh, T. (eds.), *Wittgenstein and Naturalism*, London: Routledge, 2018, 56-76.
2. Hutto, D.D.,&Myin, E. (2013). Radicalizing enactivism: Basic minds without content. Cambridge:MIT Press.
3. **Intentionality and Niche construction (Monday 8, Wednesday 17)**

**Mandatory Readings.**

1. Rouse, J. *Articulating the world*, Chicago: Chicago UP, 2015 chapter III.
2. Sterelny, K. *The Evolved Apprentice*, Camb. Mass: MIT Press, 2012, chapter II.

**Further Readings.**

1. Bickerton, D. *Adam’s Tongue*, New York: Hill and Wang.

**Methodology**

Encouraged participation in the seminar is expected, and students should arrive having carefully read the assigned material, and having prepared their thoughts and questions about the readings in advance.

For this purpose, students are required to circulate at least 1 and a maximum of 2 pages of double-spaced writing before 7:00 p.m. the night before each seminar session at the latest. These texts should concern the readings scheduled for the session that will take place on the following day. The students must send their texts to the group as email attachments. The aim of these written exercises is to deal with the mandatory readings. The students can do this in the way that is most useful to them, summarizing the material, criticizing one of the arguments or defending the author of a possible criticism. These documents will not be given any marks, but students must send them all to pass the course.

**Assessment**

-Two individual oral presentations of selected texts (weight: 20% each).

-A written research essay (weight: 60%).

**Meeting Dates**

Monday and Wednesday from 10:30 a.m. to 1:00 p.m., according to the following schedule:

August: Monday 6, Wednesday 8, Monday 13, (Wednesday 15 pubic holiday ), Wednesday 22, Monday 27, Wednesday 29.

September: Monday 3, Wednesday 5, (Monday 17 and Wednesday 19 public holidays), Wednesday 26.

October: Monday 1, Wednesday 3, Monday 8, Wednesday 10 (Spring School), (Monday 15 public holiday).

**Bibiliography**

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Burge, T. (2010). The origins of objectivity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Cash, M. (2008). The normativity problem: Evolution and naturalized semantics. Journal of Mind and Behavior, 29(1–2), 99–138.

Clapin, H. (Ed.). (2002). The philosophy of mental representation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Colombo, M. (2013). Explaining social norm compliance. A plea for neural representations. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.

Csibra, G., & Gergely, G. (2009). Natural pedagogy. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 13(4), 148–153.

Davidson, D. (1984). Inquiries into truth and interpretation. Oxford: Clarendon.

Davidson, D. (2001), *Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective*, Oxford, Oxford UP

Dennett, D. C. (1985). Brainstorms. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Dennett, D. C. (1987). The intentional stance. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Dennett, D.C. (2009). Intentional systems theory. In B.McLaughlin, A. Beckermann, & S.Walter (Eds.), The

Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind (pp. 339–50). Oxford University Press: Oxford.

Dretske, F. I. (1988). Explaining behaviour: Reasons in a world of causes. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Flanagan, O. (1991). The science of the mind. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Fodor, J. (1990). A theory of content and other essays. Cambridge:MIT Press.

Fodor, J. A. (2008). LOT 2: The language of thought revisited. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Fodor, J.A. (2013). Meaningful Words Without Sense, and Other Revolutions. 3: AM Magazine. http://www.

3ammagazine.com/3am/words-without-sense-and-other-revolutions/

Fodor, J. A., & Piattelli-Palmarini, M. (2010). What Darwin got wrong. London: Profile Books.

Fodor, J. A., & Pylyshyn, Z. W. (2015). Minds without meanings: An essay on the content of concepts.

Cambridge: MIT Press.

Godfrey-Smith, P. (2006). Mental representation, naturalism and teleosemantics. In G. Macdonald & D.Papineau (Eds.), Teleosemantics (pp. 42–68). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Haugeland, J. (1990). The intentionality all-stars. Philosophical Perspectives, 4, 383–427.

Haugeland, J. (1993). Pattern and being. In B.Dahlbom (Ed.), Dennett and his critics (pp. 52–69). Oxford: Blackwell.

Haugeland, J. (1998). Truth and rule-following. In Having thought: Essays in the metaphysics of mind (pp. 305–361). Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Hutto, D. (2008). Folk-psychological narratives. The sociocultural basis of understanding reasons.

Cambridge: MIT Press.

Hutto,D.D.,&Myin, E. (2013). Radicalizing enactivism: Basicminds without content. Cambridge:MIT Press.

Hutto, D., Satne, G. “Demystifying Davidson: Radical Interpretation meets Radical Enactivism”. *Argumenta*, Issue 5, Nov. 2017.

Hutto, D. & Satne, G. (eds.) (2015), *The Natural Origins of Content*, Special Issue of *Philosophia*. *Philosophical Quarterly of Israel*, 43:3, 2015. With Contributions by K. Sterelny, A. Rosemberg, M. Rowlands among others.

Machery, E. (2011). A better philosophy for a better psychology: Comment on Slaney and Racine. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 31(2), 90–95.

McGinn, C. (1989). Mental content. Oxford: Blackwell.

McDowell, J. 1998. Mind, value and reality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Millikan, R. G. (1984). Language, thought and other biological categories. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Millikan, R. G. (1993). White queen psychology and other essays for Alice. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Millikan, R. G. (2004). Varieties of meaning: The 2002 Jean Nicod lectures. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Millikan, R. G. (2005). Language: A biological model. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Papineau, D. (1987). Reality and representation. Oxford: OUP

Prinz, J. (2004). Gut reactions. A perceptual theory of emotions. Oxford: OUP.

Putnam, H. (1992). Renewing philosophy. Cambridge: Harvard UP.

Quine, W. V. O. (1960). Word and object. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Quine, W. V. O. (1995). From stimulus to science. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Rakoczy, H., Warneken, F., & Tomasello, M. (2008). The sources of normativity: young children’s awareness of the normative structure of games. Developmental Psychology, 44(3), 875–881.

Ritchie, J. (2008). Understanding naturalism. Stocksfield: Acumen.

Rosenberg, A. (2013). How Jerry Fodor slid down the slippery slope to anti-Darwinsism, and how we can avoid the same fate. *European Journal of Philosophy of Science*, 3, 1–17.

Rouse, J. (2015). *Articulating the World,* Chicago: Chicago UP.

Rupert, R. (2011). Embodiment, consciousness, and the massively representational mind. *Philosophical Topics*, 39(1), 99–120.

Searle, J. (1983). Intentionality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Searle, J. (1992). The rediscovery of the mind. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Shea, N. (2013). Naturalising representational content. Philosophy Compass, 8(5), 496-509.

Stalnaker, R. C. (1987). Inquiry. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Sterelny, K. (2012). The evolved apprentice: How evolution made humans unique. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Tomasello, M. (1999). The cultural origins of human cognition. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Varga, S. Intentionality, normativity and Naturalism, Philosophia, 43 (3):611-624 (2015)