Agenda

Ciclo de Seminarios «Extended and Group Knowledge»

El Departamento de Filosofía tiene el agrado de invitar a los seminarios y a la conferencia que realizará Orestis Palermos, Postdoc Extended Knowledge Project, Eidyn Centre, University of Edinburgh.
Todas las actividades serán en inglés.

SEMINARIOS CON PREINSCRIPCIÓN
EXTENDED AND GROUP KNOWLEDGE SEMINAR SERIES

Esta serie de seminarios se enfocará en ideas filosóficas emergentes de la intersección entre la epistemología contemporánea por una parte, y la filosofía de la mente y ciencias cognitivas por otra. Se analizará la compatibilidad de la epistemología externista con el externismo cognitivo. En particular, se considerará si es posible que los procesos generadores de conocimiento se extiendan a los artefactos que utilizamos o que sean distribuidos entre varios individuos al mismo tiempo. Y si esto es posible, ¿cómo deberíamos entender las nociones de conocimiento extendido y grupal resultantes?

Inscripciones: ldebrasi@uahurtado.cl

El académico también dictará una conferencia abierta a todo público (VER MÁS).

Seminar 1: Epistemic and Cognitive Externalism
This first seminar will focus on the introduction of epistemic and cognitive externalism. Grasping the main ideas behind these currents of contemporary philosophy is key to understanding the concepts of extended and group knowledge. In the first half of this seminar we will focus on the distinction between epistemic internalism and externalism: Does knowledge and justification rely solely on what is internal to our conscious psychology? The second half will be dedicated on the distinction between cognitive internalism and externalism: Where does the mind stop and where does the external world begin?

Suggested reading:

• Greco, J. (1999). Agent reliabilism. In James Tomberlin (Ed.), Philosophical perspectives 13: Epistemology. (pp. 273–296). Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Press
• Goldman, Alvin and Beddor, Bob, Reliabilist Epistemology, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
• Pappas, George, «Internalist vs. Externalist Conceptions of Epistemic Justification», The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.),
• Clark, A. (1998). Embodied, situated, and distributed cognition. In W. Bechtel and G. Graham (eds.), A Companion to Cognitive Science. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers.
• Clark, A., & Chalmers, D. (1998). The extended mind. Analysis, 58(1), 7–19.
• Palermos, S. O. (2014). Loops, constitution, and cognitive extension. Cognitive systems research, 27, 25-41.
• Theiner, G., Allen, C., & Goldstone, R. (2010). Recognizing group cognition. Cognitive Systems Research, 11(4), 378–395.
• Palermos, S. O. (manuscript). The Dynamics of Group Cognition.

Seminar 2: Extended and Group Knowledge
How should we think of extended and group knowledge? Drawing on the points raised in seminar 1, in this seminar we will focus on the combination of virtue reliabilism from contemporary epistemology with the hypothesis of extended and distributed cognition from contemporary philosophy of mind. This will allow the introduction of a concept of epistemic responsibility and justification capable to accommodate all kinds of knowledge, independently of whether it has been produced intracranially or in an extended and socially extended (i.e., distributed) fashion.

Suggested reading:

• Pritchard, D. (2010). Cognitive ability and the extended cognition thesis. Synthese, 175, 133–151.
• Carter, J. A., Kallestrup, J., Palermos, S. O., & Pritchard, D. (2014). Varieties of externalism.Philosophical Issues, 24(1), 63-109.
• Palermos, S. O. (2014). Knowledge and cognitive integration. Synthese, 191(8), 1931-1951.

Seminar 3: Extended and Group Knowledge – Examples and Ramifications
Having introduced the concepts of extended and group knowledge, this last seminar will focus on exploring concrete examples from everyday life, scientific practice, education and the Web. In the process, practical and ethical ramifications of extended and group knowledge will also be raised and discussed.

Suggested reading:

• Palermos, S. O. (2015). Active externalism, virtue reliabilism and scientific knowledge.Synthese 192, no. 9 (2015): 2955-2986.
• Palermos, S. O., & Pritchard, D. (2013). Extended knowledge and social epistemology. Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective, 2(8), 105-120.
• Palermos, S. O. (manuscript). Group Knowledge: Virtue Reliabilism, Distributed Cognition and Strong Epistemic Anti-Individualism.
• Palermos, S. O., & Pritchard, D. H. (2015). ‘To Google, or not to Google, During Exams?’,Education Technology. [Available at http://edtechnology.co.uk/Article/to-google-or-not-to-google-during-exams].
• Sparrow, B., Liu, J., & Wegner, D. M. (2011). Google effects on memory: Cognitive consequences of having information at our fingertips. Science, 333(6043), 776-778.

Esta actividad se realizará en el marco del Proyecto Fondecyt 11140279 del profesor Leandro De Brasi y de las actividades del Doctorado en Filosofía y del Magíster en Filosofía de la Mente, del Lenguaje y la Cognición UAH.